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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Phillip Smalley was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse of a
vulnerable adult, and one count of sexual penetration with a foreign object, all for allegedly
sexually assaulting an elderly patient in the assisted living facility in which he worked. On
appeal, Mr. Smalley asserts two claims of error. First, he contends there is insufficient evidence
to sustain his convictions for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult because in order to be a
“vulnerable adult” the alleged victim must have lacked “understanding or capacity” and, while
the State offered substantial evidence as to her physical infirmity, it utterly failed to prove any
mental deficits. Second, he contends the district court erred in admitting the victim’s deposition
in lieu of her live testimony, as the State failed to show she was “unavailable” to testify. Without
a showing of unavailability, admission of the out-of-court statements from the deposition
violated Mr. Smalley’s rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the Idaho
Rules of Evidence concerning admission of hearsay.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Rose Terrace Country Homes is a small assisted living facility in Spirit Lake, Idaho. (See
3/8/16 Tr., p.354, Ls.23-24; 3/9/16 Tr., p.489, Ls.3-16.) One of the patients living at Rose
Terrace in the summer of 2015 was Frances Blankenburg, a 102-year old woman with a host of
physical infirmities. (See 3/9/16 Tr., p.490, L.24 – p.491, L.8, p.521, L.20 – p.523, L.25, p.536,
L.11 – p.539, L.8.) Ms. Blankenburg was weak and suffered from osteoarthritis, so she could
not move (even just to sit up or roll over in bed) without assistance; she was also incontinent and
very hard of hearing. (3/9/16 Tr., p.522, L.11 – p.523, L.25, p.537, L.12 – p.539, L.8.)

1

Phillip Smalley was a caregiver at Rose Terrace in the summer of 2015.

(3/9/16

Tr., p.491, L.24 – p.493, L.1; 3/10/16 Tr., p.596, Ls.3-8.) For some of that time, Mr. Smalley
worked the night shift, which was from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. (See 3/10/16 Tr., p.596, Ls.1924.) On the night shift, Mr. Smalley worked alone and was solely responsible for: caring for the
patients—including “med count”1 and doing “rounds” multiple times each night to check on the
sleeping patients and, if necessary, change their soiled adult diapers and do “peri care” 2;
maintaining security; and beginning preparations for the following day’s meals.

(3/10/16

Tr., p.596, L.23 – p.597, L.5, p.597, Ls.17-22, p.598, Ls.6-12, p.607, L.24 – p.609, L.8.)
On August 14, 2015, Ms. Blankenburg claimed that Mr. Smalley had sexually assaulted
her the night before. (See 3/9/16 Tr., pp.99-100.) This led to her being transported to Kootenai
Medical Center for a sexual assault examination. (See 3/8/16 Tr., p.353, L.23 – p.354, L.24,
3/9/16 Tr., p.524, L.21 – p.525, L.7.) Ms. Blankenburg told the sexual assault nurse examiner
that someone had come into her room and forced her to put her hand on his penis; had rolled her
over and attempted to penetrate her anus with either his penis or his finger; and had rubbed her
vaginal area with his hand. (3/8/16 Tr., p.356, L.9 – p.358, L.16.) Ms. Blankenburg also told the
nurse this individual had done something similar a couple weeks prior. (3/8/16 Tr., p.358, Ls.1721.) During the subsequent forensic examination, the nurse observed that Ms. Blankenburg had

1

Mr. Smalley was never asked what “med count” was; however, based on the context in which
his med count duties as a “Meditech” were discussed, it appears to have been the evening
medication distribution to patients. (See 3/10/16 Tr., p.597, L.9 – p.598, L.2; see also 3/9/16
Tr., p.519, Ls.8-21 (suggesting that Meditechs are tasked with dispensing medication, and
testifying that Mr. Smalley was a Meditech).)
2
“Peri care” refers to washing the perineal area with soap and water after a soiled diaper has
been changed in order to reduce the chances of urinary tract infections and/or skin irritation.
(See 3/10/16 Tr., p.609, L.7 – p.611, L.15; see also 3/9/16 Tr., p.512, L.8 – p.514, L.17 (Rose
Terrace manager testifying about the appropriate way to clean patients during diaper changes).)
2

what appeared to be a bruised knuckle, as well as some redness and signs of abrasion in
Ms. Blankenburg’s vaginal area (3/8/16 Tr., ., p.359, Ls.13-18, p.360, L.3 – p.369, L.3).
Based on Ms. Blankenburg’s disclosures, Mr. Smalley was initially charged with one
count of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult and one count of sexual penetration with a foreign
object—both for events allegedly occurring on the night of August 13-14, 2015.3 (See R., pp.1820.) Later, the State was permitted to amend the complaint to add a second count of sexual
abuse of a vulnerable adult based on the allegation of inappropriate sexual touching a couple
weeks prior. (See R., pp.106-08.)
In the meantime, the State had already moved to take Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition to
preserve her testimony. (R., pp.84-85; see also R., p.530 (supporting evidence).) That motion
was granted by a magistrate (R., pp.126-27), and Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition was taken at
Rose Terrace on September 14, 2015 (see generally R. Ex., pp.1-87 (unredacted copy of
deposition transcript)). It was videotaped and transcribed by a court reporter. (See generally
Trial Exs. 1A & 1B.)
In her deposition, Ms. Blankenburg could not actually identify Mr. Smalley (see R. Ex.,
p.93; see also R. Ex., pp.99-100 (testifying she previously described her alleged assailant as
“[t]he man that comes at night”)), but testified that during one of her early contacts with him, a
male caregiver came into her room during the night and rubbed her vagina with the palm of his

3

The original and amended informations also contained allegations relating to a second alleged
victim, Donna Hindberg. (See R., pp.18-20, 106-08.) However, Mr. Smalley was not bound
over as to any counts relating to Ms. Hindberg and those counts were dismissed. (See
R., pp.120, 121.) The State re-filed the allegations relating to Ms. Hindberg as a charge of
misdemeanor abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult in Kootenai County Case No. CR-201517901, but Mr. Smalley was ultimately acquitted of that charge. (See PSI, p.19; see also Idaho
Supreme Court Data Repository (available at <https://www.idcourts.us/repository/mainpublic_
id.do?forward=mainpublic_id>).)
3

hand while checking to see if her diaper was wet, but that she decided not to report him unless he
did it again. (R. Ex., pp.94-96.) She then went on to testify that a couple weeks later, the
caregiver4 rubbed his erect penis against her vaginal area and placed her hand on his penis,5 then
proceeded to flip her over and attempt to penetrate her anus with either his finger or his penis.
(R. Ex., pp.96-98, 99.) She testified that she did not say anything to him at any point in this
process. (R. Ex., p.98.)
The deposition transcript was admitted in lieu of Ms. Blankenburg’s live testimony at
Mr. Smalley’s preliminary hearing. (See R., p.117.) Ultimately, Mr. Smalley was bound over on
all three counts.

(R., p.121; see also R., pp.133-35 (information), pp.419-21 (amended

information altering slightly the means of commission of two of the three charged offenses).)
Prior to trial, the State moved in limine for admission of the deposition transcript and
video in lieu of Ms. Blankenburg’s live testimony.

(R., pp.165-67.)

It argued that

Ms. Blankenburg was unavailable to testify because, “Ms. Blankenburg was a 102 year old bedridden adult, under the care of hospice, and [was] unable to safely be transported and provide
testimony inside of a traditional courtroom setting,” and her condition was not expected to
improve prior to trial. (R., pp.165, 167.)
The defense objected to the State’s motion in limine. (See R., pp.557-62, 564-67.) It
argued, inter alia, that admission of the deposition in lieu of live testimony would deprive

4

Ms. Blankenburg testified that her alleged assailant had bumps “all over” his penis. (R. Ex.,
p.97.) The State tried to use this testimony as a positive identification of Mr. Smalley because a
urologist testified that Mr. Smalley has pearly penile papules, dome-shaped lesions that appear
normally in about 30% of men, on his penis. (See 3/9/16 Tr., p.417, L.17 – p.420, L.20.)
However, the urologist testified that the supposed papules were not all over Mr. Smalley’s penis,
but were limited to the glans penis (as distinguished from the shaft or base of his penis). (3/9/16
Tr., p.420, Ls.19-20, p.426, Ls.14-18.)
4

Mr. Smalley of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because
Ms. Blankenburg was not “unavailable.” (See R., pp.558-59, 564-67.) Likewise, it argued the
deposition was inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804 (identifying the hearsay
exceptions for unavailable witnesses) because the State failed to demonstrate Ms. Blankenburg
was “unavailable” to testify at trial. (See R., pp.561-62, 564-67.)
A hearing was held on the State’s motion, during which the State attempted to
demonstrate Ms. Blankenburg’s unavailability through evidence concerning her poor physical
health. Mary Jean Tranfo, a hospice nurse who visited Ms. Blankenburg at Rose Terrace and
assisted in her care, testified that Ms. Blankenburg was by then 103 years old, had rheumatoid
arthritis with contractures of her hands and feet and pain in all of her joints. (1/8/16 Tr., p.15,
Ls.16-19, p.31, L.20 – p.32, L.13.)

She said Ms. Blankenburg was incontinent.

(1/8/16

Tr., p.15, L.19.) She said Ms. Blankenburg had difficulty swallowing, which had caused her to
lose a great deal of weight. (See 1/8/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-16, p.15, Ls.19-21.) She testified that
Ms. Blankenburg was extremely hard of hearing, and spoke in a very soft, raspy voice. (1/8/16
Tr., pp.18, L.10 – p.19, L.8.)

She also discussed Ms. Blankenburg’s mobility problems,

explaining that Ms. Blankenburg could not roll over in bed without help or stand on her own, and
required assistance with all of the activities of daily living. (1/8/16 Tr., p.16, Ls.12-21.)
Ms. Tranfo also initially said she had never known Ms. Blankenburg to have left Rose
Terrace (1/8/16 Tr., p.18, Ls.6-9), although she later conceded that Ms. Blankenburg had, in fact,
left Rose Terrace when she went to Kootenai Medical Center by ambulance for a sexual assault
examination. (1/8/16 Tr., p.19, L.9 – p.20, L.2, p.22, Ls.7-12.) Along these lines, she also

5

Ms. Blankenburg’s testimony was internally inconsistent on this point. First, she testified the
genital-to-genital contact preceded the manual-to-genital contact, but moments later she reversed
the order. (See R. Ex., pp.96-97.)
5

acknowledged there are special forms of transport—such as vans with wheelchair lifts—
available for hospice patients with significant physical limitations (1/8/16 Tr., p.35, Ls.2-18), and
that Ms. Blankenburg regularly used a wheelchair to get around Rose Terrace and, though she
did not typically spend significant amounts of time in the wheelchair, as she usually sat in an
easy chair, Ms. Tranfo had observed her sit in a wheelchair for as long as 90 minutes (1/8/16
Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.18, L.5).
The State also presented two letters from doctors concerning Ms. Blankenburg’s physical
condition. One letter was from Dr. Thomas P. Martin, the medical director for the hospice
service that employed Ms. Tranfo. (See 1/8/16 Tr., p.42, Ls.4-7.) Dr. Martin’s letter stated, in
relevant part, as follows:
[Frances Blankenburg] is a frail and elderly 103yo woman admitted for hospice
care for complications associated with longstanding Rheumatoid Arthritis.
Frances requires full assistance with all Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), and
has a bed-to-chair existence. The stress of the abuse she recently suffered has
resulted in compounding her global debility and failure to thrive, and she has
verbalized the wish to die.
Because she requires full care and assistance with ADLs, she currently resides in
an assisted living facility which provides around-the-clock presence of persons to
assist her and provide care.
(R. Ex., p.88.) The other letter was from Dr. Lorene Lindley, Ms. Blankenburg’s treating
physician.

(See 1/8/16 Tr., p.42, Ls.4-7.)

Her letter stated, in relevant part, that

Ms. Blankenburg, “is currently bed and chair bound due to generalized osteoarthritis. She also
has age-related difficulty with swallowing…. Her medical condition has been fairly stable in
recent months, but it is impossible to predict what will happen in the next few months, since she
is 103 years old.” (R. Ex., p.89.)
The district court suggested that, based upon the foregoing evidence, it was inclined to
find Ms. Blankenburg to be “unavailable” for trial, although it officially took the matter under

6

advisement pending its review of the deposition video.6 (See 1/8/16 Tr., p.54, L.17 – p.57, L.7.)
Later, the district court entered a written order granting the State’s motion in limine.
(R., pp.292-95.) In relevant part, the court implicitly found Ms. Blankenburg to be unavailable
for trial: “Ms. Blankenburg appears clearly unable to be present at trial for live testimony.”
(R., p.294.)
Consistent with the district court’s ruling, redacted versions of the deposition transcript
and video7 were admitted at trial. (See 3/9/16 Tr., p.553, L.20 – p.555, L.10; see also R. Ex.,
pp.90-110; Trial Exhibit 1A.) In addition to the deposition testimony of Ms. Blankenburg, the
jury received live testimony from a number of witnesses. The jury heard from the sexual assault
nurse examiner discussed above (see generally 3/8/16 Tr., p.348, L.1 – p.408, L.21), as well as
the emergency physician who oversaw her work (see generally 3/9/16 Tr., p.431, L.7 – p.445,
L.3). The jury heard from the urologist whose opinion about pearly penile papules was noted
above. (See generally 3/9/16 Tr., p.414, L.5 – p.431, L.1.) The jury heard from two individuals
affiliated with Rose Terrace—the manager (see generally 3/9/16 Tr., p.488, L.7 – p.520, L.23)
and another caregiver (see generally 3/9/16 Tr., p.445, L.11 – p.487, L.24)—who testified about

6

The redacted version of the video of the deposition appears in the appellate record as Trial
Exhibit 1A. As this Court can see by comparing the redacted copy of the transcript of the
deposition (R. Ex., pp.90-110) with the unredacted copy (R., pp.1-87), the redactions primarily
consisted of removing defense counsel’s objections to the prosecutor’s questions, as well as
some of Ms. Blankenburg’s answers that were deemed inadmissible at trial. Thus, the redactions
would have had no effect on the district court’s determination of whether Ms. Blankenburg was
unavailable to testify at trial.
Presumably, the district court was simply observing
Ms. Blankenburg in the video to evaluate just how frail she appeared to be.
7
In addition to the fight over whether the deposition could generally be used in lieu of live
testimony, the parties also argued extensively over specific objections and redactions of the
deposition transcript and video for other reasons. (See, e.g., 2/26/16 Tr., p.141, L.9 – p.161,
L.14.) Those disputes over specific redactions are not at issue in this appeal, as Mr. Smalley
focuses his appellate challenge on the question of whether the district court erred in finding
Ms. Blankenburg to be an “unavailable” witness.

7

Ms. Blankenburg’s condition, as well Ms. Smalley’s work at Rose Terrace. And the jury heard
from two witnesses—one of Ms. Blankenburg’s daughters (see generally 3/9/16 Tr., p.521, L.7 –
p.531, L.18) and the hospice nurse discussed above (see generally 3/9/16 Tr., p.532, L.1 – p.550,
L.15)—who testified almost exclusively about Ms. Blankenburg’s infirm condition. Notably, a
good deal of this evidence portrayed Ms. Blankenburg as severely physically infirm, but
nonetheless mentally sound. (See 3/8/16 Tr., p.359, Ls.6-8, p.369, Ls.4-10; 3/9/16 Tr., p.458,
Ls.8-18, p.491, Ls.5-21, p.507, Ls.3-19, p.522, L.12 – p.524, L.15, p.536, Ls.17-25, p.537, L.12
– p.539, L.21.)
Mr. Smalley exercised his right to testify. (See generally 3/10/16 Tr., p.595, L.16 –
p.645, L.18.) He acknowledged checking on Ms. Blankenburg multiple times on the night of
August 13-14, 2015, and said he changed her diaper and engaged in peri care, but he denied any
improper sexual contact or conduct. (3/10/16 Tr., p.602, L.14 – p.616, L.14.) Nevertheless, the
jury ultimately returned with guilty verdicts on all three counts. (3/11/16 Tr., p.714, Ls.9-24;
R., p.483.)
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing held a couple months later (see generally
5/2/16 Tr., p.720, L.1 – p.758, L.22), the district court imposed three concurrent sentences of 25
years, with ten years fixed (5/2/16 Tr., p.756, L.25 – p.757, L.8; R., p.501). The district court
entered a written judgment of conviction on May 4, 2016. (R., pp.500-02.)
On May 19, 2016, Mr. Smalley filed a notice of appeal that was timely from the
judgment of conviction. On appeal, he asserts two claims of error. First, he contends there is
insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for two counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable
adult because in order to be a “vulnerable adult” Ms. Blankenburg must have lacked
“understanding or capacity” and, while the State offered substantial evidence as to physical

8

infirmity, it utterly failed to prove any mental deficits. Second, he contends the district court
erred in admitting Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition in lieu of her live testimony, as the State failed
to show she was “unavailable” to testify.

9

ISSUES
I.

Did the State offer sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Smalley’s convictions for sexual
abuse of a vulnerable adult?

II.

Did the district court err in admitting Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition in lieu of live
testimony?

10

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Failed To Offer Sufficient Evidence To Sustain Mr. Smalley’s Convictions For Sexual
Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult
A.

Introduction
Mr. Smalley was tried on two counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult, I.C. § 18-

1505B(1)(a). (See R., pp.419-21 (amended information).) Both counts related to the same
alleged victim, Frances Blankenburg, and both, therefore, required the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ms. Blankenburg was a “vulnerable adult,” as defined by Idaho Code
section 18-1505. See I.C. § 18-1505B(2)(d).
In order to satisfy the “vulnerable adult” element, the State was required to prove, inter
alia, that Ms. Blankenburg “lack[ed] sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate or implement decisions” regarding her person. I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e). In other
words, the State had to prove that, owing to her mental deficits, Ms. Blankenburg was incapable
of consenting to sexual contact.

State v. Knutsen, 158 Idaho 199, 204-05 (2015).

Ms. Blankenburg’s physical condition was irrelevant to this question.
At trial, the State presented no evidence whatsoever suggesting Ms. Blankenburg
“lack[ed] sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions”
regarding her person. (In fact, the State sought to show that Ms. Blankenburg was quite mentally
fit despite her old age.) Rather, the State mistakenly believed it could prove Ms. Blankenburg
was a “vulnerable adult” by showing that she was physically infirm.
Because the State failed to offer any evidence that Ms. Blankenburg “lack[ed] sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions” regarding her
person, it failed to prove she was a “vulnerable adult” within the meaning of Idaho Code section

11

18-1505(4)(e). As this was an element of the offenses charged in Counts I and III, the State
failed to offer sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Smalley’s convictions as to those counts, and
both convictions should be reversed.

B.

A “Vulnerable Adult” Is One Who Lacks “Understanding Or Capacity”
In order for Mr. Smalley to have been found guilty of the two counts of sexual abuse of a

vulnerable adult charged in this case, the State was required to prove that he, with the specific
intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying his lust, passion or sexual desire, committed lewd
or lascivious acts (consisting of manual-to-genital and/or genital-to-genital contact), with
Frances Blankenburg, who is a “vulnerable adult.”

See I.C. § 18-1505B(1)(a); see also

R., pp.419-20 (amended information). The critical element, as far as this appeal is concerned, is
whether Ms. Blankenburg was a “vulnerable adult.”
The sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute incorporates the definition of “vulnerable
adult” that appears in a different section of Title 18, Chapter 15. See I.C. § 18-1505(2)(d)
(“‘Vulnerable adult’ is as defined in section 18-1505, Idaho Code.”). That section defines
“vulnerable adult” as follows:
[A] person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is unable to protect himself
from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental impairment which
affects the person’s judgment or behavior to the extent that he lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions
regarding his person, funds, property or resources.
I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e).
Below, the State took the view that the foregoing definition of “vulnerable adult”
includes individuals who are so physically infirm that they are unable to effectively resist sexual
assault. (See, e.g., R., p.638 (State’s proposed jury instruction on the definition of “vulnerable
adult,” selectively striking language from the pattern instruction (ICJC 990) in order to make it

12

read as if it pertains to physically-incapacitated individuals); 3/10/16 Tr., p.661, L.19 – p.662,
L.7) (State requesting an alternate revision of ICJC 990’s definition of “vulnerable adult”
“because obviously this is a physical impairment case”).) However, that is not an accurate
reading of the statute.
The plain language of section 18-1505(4)(e) demonstrates that a person is a “vulnerable
adult” when she is mentally unable to protect herself. Specifically, the statute provides that she
is a “vulnerable adult” when she “lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate or implement decisions ….” I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e) (emphasis added). And while
the statute does include a reference to a “physical … impairment,” any such impairment is only
relevant to the extent it affects the person’s “understanding or capacity.” See id. (referencing a
“physical or mental impairment which affects the person’s judgment or behavior to the extent
that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity”) (emphasis added). Because section 181505(4)(e) clearly and unambiguously defines “vulnerable adult” in terms of mental unfitness—
as opposed to physical unfitness—Idaho’s courts are bound to follow that definition.

See

Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Cent., 151 Idaho 889, 893-96 (2011) (holding that if a
statute is unambiguous, it must be applied as written (even if the result would, in the court’s
view, be unsound) and a court may not interpret the statute to mean something it does not say, as
only the Legislature may revise a statute).8
This plain reading of section 18-1505(4)(e) is consistent with precedent from the Idaho
Supreme Court. In State v. Knutsen, 158 Idaho 199 (2015), the Court was asked to determine

8

One could certainly argue that elderly persons as physically infirm as Ms. Blankenburg should
be accorded special status under Idaho law to better protect them from unwanted sexual contact
such as that which was alleged in this case. However, if that is to be the case, it is up to the
Idaho Legislature, not this Court, to change the law.
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whether section 18-1505(e)(2) is unconstitutionally overbroad for restricting the rights of
“vulnerable adults” to engage in sexual activity. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the statute
withstands scrutiny because the constitutional right to engage in sexual activity applies only in
the case of consenting adults and, by definition, a “vulnerable adult” is someone who legally
lacks the capacity to consent to sexual activity:
Although the victim was an adult, as a matter of law she was unable to consent to
the sexual conduct. Even though the word “consent” is not in the statute, it is a
legislative determination that vulnerable adults as defined in the statute are
unable to consent to the sexual conduct described in the statute…. In enacting
Idaho Code section 18–1505B, the legislature defined a specific group of adults
who, as a matter of law, are unable to consent to the proscribed sexual conduct.
Knutsen, 158 Idaho 204-05 (emphasis added). By speaking in terms of the ability to consent, the
Supreme Court made it clear that the statutory definition of “vulnerable adult” is couched in
terms of the mental fitness or capacity—not the physical capabilities—of the person. 9 See id.

C.

The State Was Required To Prove, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, Every Element Of
Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult
As the United States Supreme Court has long recognized, “[t]he principle that there is a

presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).

Intertwined with this presumption of

innocence, “[t]he requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
361 (1970). “The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on

9

In Knutsen, the victim had a full scale IQ of just 72, and suffered from mental health problems
(she was depressed and suicidal). Knutsen, 158 Idaho at 200.
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factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that
bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.’” Id. at 363 (quoting Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453.) Thus, both
the presumption of innocence and the “reasonable doubt” standard are mandated by the due
process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; see
Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453.
The finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is within the province of the jury, as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair jury trial. As the Supreme Court has held:
It is self-evident ... that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are
interrelated. It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine
that the defendant is probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to
determine (as Winship requires) whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In other words, the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) (emphasis and parenthetical in original).
Despite the many procedural safeguards built into our criminal justice system, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “a properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even
when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ….”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979). “Under Winship, … it follows that when such a
conviction occurs in a state trial, it cannot constitutionally stand.” Id. at 317-18. Thus,
After Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction must be … to determine whether the
record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to “ask itself whether it believes
that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S., at 282, 87 S.Ct., at 486 (emphasis added). Instead, the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S., at 362, 92 S.Ct., at 1624-1625. This familiar standard gives
full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
15

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime
charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a
legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered
in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The criterion thus impinges upon
“jury” discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental
protection of due process of law.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (footnotes omitted).
In light of the foregoing, the Idaho Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the State
is constitutionally-required to present evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the question of whether the State has met that burden is reviewable on appeal. See
State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 545 (2015). With regard to the standard of review, it has held as
follows:
The relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether “after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Adamcik,
152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979)) (emphasis in
original).
Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 546. This question is reviewed de novo. Id.

D.

The State Failed To Prove That Ms. Blankenburg Was A Vulnerable Adult
As noted above, the State incorrectly believed it could prove Ms. Blankenburg was a

“vulnerable adult” for purposes of sections 18-1505(4)(e) and 18-1505B(1)(a) by proving that
she was physically infirm. As a consequence, it offered no evidence whatsoever suggesting that
she “lack[ed] sufficient understanding or capacity” to consent to sexual contact. Accordingly,
the State failed to meet its constitutional burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and
Mr. Smalley’s convictions for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult, therefore, cannot be allowed to
stand.
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The State offered extensive evidence that Ms. Blankenburg was physically infirm, but
mentally sound. That evidence was as follows:
•

Linda LeVasseur, Ms. Blankenburg’s daughter, testified that Ms. Blankenburg went
into Rose Terrace because of her lack of mobility owing to arthritis; that she cannot
sit up, walk or move out of her bed without assistance; and that she is extremely hard
of hearing and speaks very softly because of her hearing loss. (3/9/16 Tr., p.522,
L.12 – p.524, L.15.) However, Ms. LeVasseur testified her mother is mentally alert,
is able to converse, and does quite a bit of reading. (3/9/16 Tr., p.524, Ls.1-15.)
Ms. LeVasseur testified her mother “is frail in body, but clear in her mind.” (3/9/16
Tr., p.522, Ls.21-22.)

•

Mary Jean Tranfo, a hospice nurse who traveled to Rose Terrace to assist in caring for
Ms. Blankenburg (and other hospice patients living there), testified quite extensively
about Ms. Blankenburg’s physical problems.

She said Ms. Blankenburg was

admitted to hospice because she was having difficulty swallowing and had lost a
significant amount of weight, and was not expected to live more than six months.
(3/9/16 Tr., p.536, Ls.17-25.)

She went on to detail all of Ms. Blankenburg’s

physical problems—from arthritis, to muscle weakness, to swallowing problems, to
incontinence—and to explain the limitations those physical problems caused in dayto-day life.

(3/9/16 Tr., p.537, L.12 – p.539, L.8.)

She also discussed

Ms. Blankenburg’s mental state though, testifying that Ms. Blankenburg knew the
people around her, knew where she was, understood what was going on in Rose
Terrace, and remembered who had come to visit her. (3/9/16 Tr., p.539, Ls.12-21.)
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•

Angela Callander, a caregiver at Rose Terrace, testified that Ms. Blankenburg could
not sit up without assistance, and that she did not think Ms. Blankenburg could roll
over in bed without assistance. (3/9/16 Tr., p.458, Ls.8-18.)

•

Tanya Strate, the manager of (and a CNA caregiver at) Rose Terrace, testified about
some of Ms. Blankenburg’s physical limitations. (3/9/16 Tr., p.491, Ls.5-21, p.507,
Ls.3-11.) She also testified that Ms. Blankenburg talked a lot though, mostly with her
daughter, Ms. LeVasseur. (3/9/16 Tr., p.507, Ls.12-19.)

•

Jane Spohn, a registered nurse at Kootenai Medical Center who examined and spoke
with Ms. Blankenburg after the alleged sexual assault, testified that Ms. Blankenburg
was “answering me appropriately. She was coherent” (3/8/16 Tr., p.3589, Ls.6-8),
and although Ms. Blankenburg was wearing a headset to hear, she was “cogent”
(3/8/16 Tr., p.369, Ls.4-10).

In short, the State presented overwhelming evidence that Ms. Blankenburg was old, weak, and
immobile, but absolutely no evidence to suggest she was mentally unfit. Indeed, the State’s
evidence tended to suggest Ms. Blankenburg was, as her daughter put it, “frail in body, but clear
in her mind.”
Because the State offered no evidence whatsoever of any compromised mental state,
there was no evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found that Ms. Blankenburg
“lack[ed] sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions
regarding [her] person,” so as to be a “vulnerable adult” under sections 18-1505(4)(e) and 181505B(2)(d). Since this was a critical element of both counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable
adult, neither conviction can stand under Winship and its progeny. Therefore, Mr. Smalley
respectfully requests that this Court reverse both of those convictions.
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II.
Because Ms. Blankenburg Was Not “Unavailable,” The District Court Erred In Admitting Her
Deposition In Lieu Of Live Testimony
A.

Introduction
The district court allowed the State to present Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition video and

transcript to be presented in the jury in lieu of her live testimony. It did so based on its
conclusion that, owing to her physical infirmity, Ms. Blankenburg was unavailable to testify.
However, for a witness to be “unavailable” to testify (so as to allow some substitute for the
witness’s live testimony), there must be an unqualified inability of the witness to attend trial; it is
not enough to say that the witness’s attendance would be inconvenient. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho
255, 260 (2000). In this case, the district court found Ms. Blankenburg to “unavailable” based
on evidence that she was old, frail, and weak, and lived a bed-to-chair existence.
Mr. Smalley contends the district court erred in finding Ms. Blankenburg to be
“unavailable” to testify. The State’s evidence showed that travel to court would have been
outside Ms. Blankenburg’s normal routine, and it would have required some special
arrangements and accommodations (such as a transport van with a wheelchair lift and, perhaps,
use of a more comfortable chair in court). It also raised the inference that such travel might have
been stressful and tiring for Ms. Blankenburg. However, this evidence established only that
Ms. Blankenburg’s trial attendance would have inconvenient. It did not suggest an unqualified
inability to testify.
Because the State presented no evidence suggesting Ms. Blankenburg could not
physically be transported to court, or that she would suffer undue harm by going to court to
testify, there was an insufficient basis for the district court to rule her “unavailable” and allow
her deposition to be used in lieu of live testimony.
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B.

Applicable Legal Standards
As a general rule—whether under Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause or the Idaho

Rules of Evidence—a criminal defendant is entitled to have the witnesses against him come to
court, face him, and undergo cross-examination live in front of the jury, and the government may
not use out-of-court statements as a substitute for that live testimony. See U.S. CONST. amend.
VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the
witnesses against him ….”); I.R.E. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Idaho.”).

However, there are

exceptions under both the Confrontation Clause and the Rules of Evidence for certain situations
in which the witness against the accused is unavailable to testify at trial.
In the case of the Confrontation Clause, even testimonial hearsay10 may be admitted
against the accused if the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine that declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).

10

There cannot be any serious dispute that Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition testimony was
“testimonial” hearsay. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (describing the
“[v]arious formulations of this core class of testimonial statements” as including “formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”). This is
especially true where, as here, the deposition testimony was expressly ordered in an effort to
preserve the witness’s testimony. See I.C.R. 15(a)(1) (providing that depositions may be ordered
“in order to preserve testimony for trial,” if necessary “to prevent a failure of justice”); R., pp.8485 (requesting leave to take Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition, pursuant to I.C.R. 15, to preserve it
for use at the preliminary hearing and, presumably, trial). See also Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-11 (2009) (holding that an out of court statement—in that case
an affidavit—was testimonial, in part, because it was “functional identical to live, in-court
testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’”) (quoting Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
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Likewise, under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, prior testimony (including deposition testimony) is
admissible against the defendant if the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and if the
defendant had “an opportunity and similar motive” to cross-examine the declarant in the giving
of the prior testimony. I.R.E. 804(b)(1).
The relevant question in this case is whether Ms. Blankenburg was “unavailable” to
testify at Mr. Smalley’s trial. The question of what “unavailable” means for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause has never been well-articulated by either the United States Supreme Court
or the Idaho Supreme Court. In Ohio v. Roberts, the United States Supreme Court explained as
follows:
The basic litmus of Sixth Amendment unavailability is established: “[A] witness
is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the ... exception to the confrontation
requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to
obtain his presence at trial.”
[I]f no possibility of procuring the witness exists (as, for example, the witness’
intervening death), “good faith” demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there
is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures might produce the
declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand their effectuation. “The
lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness ... is a question of
reasonableness.”
448 U.S. 56, 74-75 (1980) (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968), and
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 n.22 (1970), respectively), overruled in part on other
grounds by Crawford, supra.

While this is an interesting holding insofar as it imposes a

diligence requirement on the government, it is largely unhelpful in actually defining what it
means for a witness to be “unavailable.”
However, with respect to another clause of the Sixth Amendment—the Speedy Trial
Clause11—Idaho’s appellate courts have meaningfully explored the definition of “unavailable.”

11

In analyzing the question of whether a pre-trial delay constitutes a violation of the defendant’s
rights under the Speedy Trial Clause, the reviewing court will evaluate four factors: (1) the
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In that context, the Court of Appeals has explained that, “True unavailability suggests an
unqualified inability to attend, while inconvenience merely implies that attendance at trial would
be burdensome.” State v. Risdon, 154 Idaho 244, 248 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Ciccone, 154
Idaho 330, 336 (Ct. App. 2012); accord State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 900 (Ct. App. 2010);
State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837 (Ct. App. 2005). Cf. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 260-61
(2000) (distinguishing unavailability, i.e., “an unqualified inability to attend,” from
inconvenience in the context of the “good cause” standard Idaho’s speedy trial statute, I.C. § 192501, but also recognizing this “good cause” standard is essentially the same as the second prong
(“reason for delay”) of the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause standard).

As this

construction of “unavailability” is not only true to the plain meaning of that term, but also is
consistent with how that term is used elsewhere under the Sixth Amendment, Mr. Smalley
contends it is the construction that ought to apply under the Confrontation Clause. He submits
that where Crawford spoke of witnesses who are “unavailable” to testify, it should be read to
have referred to witnesses who are truly unavailable (in that they have an unqualified inability to
attend), not those who are merely inconvenienced by coming to court. Such a standard would be
wholly consistent with the recent case of State v. Anderson, __ Idaho __, 2017 WL 2952458, *7
(Jul. 11, 2017), which strongly suggested that “unavailable” means truly unavailable. In that
case, the Court held the State failed to establish the unavailability of its witness (for purposes of
both the Confrontation Clause and Idaho Rule of Evidence 804) even though it proffered

length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay (and which party caused it); (3) whether the
defendant asserted his rights; and (4) any prejudice attendant to the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 530 (1972). In evaluating the second factor—the reason for delay—different weights
are assigned to different reasons. Id. at 531. One reason often invoked by the government to
justify a delay is the purported unavailability of its witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Ciccone, 154
Idaho 330, 336-40 (Ct. App. 2012).
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evidence that the witness suffered from mental illness and was in a fragile emotional state, and
that testifying would re-traumatize the witness, “pos[ing] a significant risk to her mental health”
and creating a “substantial risk for relapse on controlled substances ….”
Just as with the “unavailability” standard in the Confrontation Clause context, the
“unavailability” standard for Idaho Rule of Evidence 804 also lacks clear explication—at least as
applied to this case. The Rule itself identifies certain situations in which a witness may be
deemed “unavailable,” one of which is where she “is unable to be present or to testify at the
hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity”; however, it
does not explain what it means to be “unable to be present or to testify.” I.R.E. 804(a)(4). Here
too though, Mr. Smalley submits that the language of the Rule ought to mean precisely what its
plain language says. Where the Rule talks about “unavailability,” or the witness being “unable
to be present,” it should be read to refer to an unqualified inability to attend the trial. See
Anderson, 2017 WL 2952458 at *7 (suggesting the unavailability standard is the same under
both the Confrontation Clause and Rule 804, and that “unavailability” means a true inability to
attend).
Regardless of the precise definition of “unavailable” though, it is well-established that it
is the burden of the proponent of the out-of-court statement to establish the unavailability of the
declarant. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75; Anderson, 2017 WL 2952458 at *5; State v. LopezOrozco, 159 Idaho 375, 381 (2015).
The standard of review applied in evaluating a trial court’s ruling on “unavailability,”
however, is a harder question. In Anderson, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a district court’s
“unavailability” determination “is evidentiary in nature” and, therefore, is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Anderson, 2017 WL 2952458 at *7. However, Mr. Smalley submits the applicable
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standard of review is not quite so simple. First, he presents an argument as to the meaning of
“unavailable.” That question, at a minimum, is a question of law which should be reviewed de
novo. See State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821 (1998) (“[T]he interpretation of a rule of evidence,
like the interpretation of a statute, is reviewed de novo.”). Thus, even if an abuse of discretion
standard applies, it applies only after the de novo determination of whether “unavailable” means
an unqualified inability to attend or, instead, mere inconvenience.

Second, because the

“unavailability” determination is subsumed within a question of whether a Confrontation Clause
violation has occurred, and constitutional questions are always subject to de novo review, see
State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho 327, 331 (2015),12 that determination is subject to de novo review at
least as to Mr. Smalley’s constitutional challenge. 13

12

In Stanfield, the Idaho Supreme Court explained as follows:
This Court exercises “free review over the trial court's determination as to
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts
found.” Whether admission of evidence violates a defendant's right to confront
adverse witnesses under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause is a
question of law over which this Court exercises free review.

158 Idaho at 331 (quoting State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 142 (2007)).
Some authorities have treated the “unavailability” inquiry—whether under the Confrontation
Clause or Rule 804)—as a factual determination subject to clear-error review. See, e.g., State v.
Perry, 144 Idaho 266, 269-70 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 869 (Ct. App.
2000); State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 862-63 (Ct. App. 1992). Cf., e.g., State v. Cross, 132 Idaho
667, 669 (1999) (holding under I.C. § 9-336, a since-repealed statute governing admission of
preliminary hearing testimony, that unavailability is a factual finding reviewed for clear error).
Mr. Smalley submits, however, that these authorities are incorrect. While there is certainly room
for fact-finding in support of an “unavailability” inquiry (for example, where the witness is, or
what the witness’s present condition is), ultimately, whether a witness in “unavailable” within
the meaning of the Confrontation Clause or Rule 804 is a legal conclusion not a factual
determination.
13
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C.

Because The State Failed To Establish That Ms. Blankenburg Was “Unavailable,”
Admission Of Her Deposition In Lieu Of Her Live Testimony Violated The
Confrontation Clause And Idaho Rule Of Evidence 804
Regardless of the standard of review this Court applies, it must conclude that the State

failed to establish that Ms. Blankenburg was “unavailable” within the meaning of either the
Confrontation Clause or Rule 804.

To be sure, the State provided ample evidence that

Ms. Blankenburg was elderly, weak, and immobile, and that she required a significant amount of
assistance in day-to-day living. (See 1/8/16 Tr., p.13, L.21 – p.20, L.2; R., pp.88, 89.) It
presented evidence of her osteoarthritis, her inability to sit up or roll over (much less stand or
walk) without assistance, her difficulty swallowing, her incontinence, the fact that she was hard
of hearing and used amplifying headphones to converse with people, and her soft voice. Based
on this evidence it is readily apparent that for Ms. Blankenburg to have testified at Mr. Smalley’s
trial she would have required a wheelchair and specialized transport from Rose Terrace to the
courthouse, perhaps a more comfortable and supportive chair than that which is regularly
available on the witness stand, her adult diapers, and some sort of accommodation for her
hearing loss. Additionally, it is reasonably clear that testifying would have been stressful and
tiring for her.

However, what the State did not present was evidence suggesting that

Ms. Blankenburg was physically incapable of being transported to the courthouse or that such a
trip would have caused dire health consequences for her.

Indeed, she routinely used a

wheelchair at Rose Terrace, and she had recently left Rose Terrace for a trip to the hospital for
sexual assault examination, so it is obvious that she was capable of traveling. Thus, there is no
reason to believe she could not make a similar trip to the courthouse. Further, the evidence
before the court indicated “[h]er medical condition has been fairly stable in recent months”
(R., p.89), so there was no reason to believe traveling to the courthouse and testifying would
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have had significant adverse health consequences. Indeed, no doctor opined that testifying
would have been detrimental to her health. (See R., pp.88, 89.)
Bringing Ms. Blankenburg to court to testify at Mr. Smalley’s trial would undoubtedly
have been a significant undertaking, involving pre-planning and certain special accommodations
(such as a van with a wheelchair lift and perhaps a more comfortable chair in the courtroom).
But it was not impossible, and there is no evidence to suggest Ms. Blankenburg could not have
made the trip. It also would also undoubtedly have been unpleasant for Ms. Blankenburg. But
there is no evidence it would have had significantly worsened her health.

Under these

circumstances, testifying would have been an inconvenience. While that would have been
unfortunate for Ms. Blankenburg, it did not render her “unavailable” under the law.

As

discussed above, in order to be “unavailable” for trial the witness must have an unqualified
inability to attend, and mere inconvenience does not suffice. Because Ms. Blankenburg was not
“unavailable” within the meaning of either the Confrontation Clause or Idaho Rule of Evidence
804, the district court’s admission of her deposition in lieu of her live testimony violated both
and was, therefore, error.
Furthermore, even if this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard of review, it is
apparent that the district court erred.

As noted, the term “unavailable,” as it is used in

Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and Idaho Rule of Evidence 804, refers to an unqualified
inability of the witness to attend trial, not her mere inconvenience. Because the district court
applied the wrong standard—essentially ruling that Ms. Blankenburg was “unavailable” because
her attendance at trial would have been burdensome—it abused its discretion. See State v. Hall,
161 Idaho 413, 425 (2016) (holding that a trial court abuses its discretion when it acts outside the
boundaries of its discretion or inconsistently with applicable legal standards).
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Based on the district court’s error in ruling Ms. Blankenburg “unavailable,” this Court
should vacate Mr. Smalley’s convictions and remand his case to the district court for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, Mr. Smalley respectfully requests that this Court:
(1) reverse his two convictions for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult for lack of sufficient
evidence, and order that acquittals be entered as to both counts; (2) vacate his conviction for
sexual penetration with a foreign object based on the erroneous admission of Ms. Blankenburg’s
deposition in lieu of her live testimony; and (3) remand this case to the district court for a new
trial on the sexual penetration with a foreign object charge.
DATED this 29th day of August, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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